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Abstract
In this paper we introduce product demand uncertainty in a mixed oligopoly model and
reexamine the nature of sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) when ﬁrms decide in
the ﬁrst stage whether to lead or follow in the subsequent quantity-setting game. In the
non-stochastic setting, Pal (1998) demonstrated that when the public ﬁrm competes with a
domestic private ﬁrm, multiple equilibria exist but the eﬃcient equilibrium outcome is for
the public ﬁrm to follow. Matsumura (2003a) proved that when the public ﬁrm’s rival is a
foreign private ﬁrm, leadership of the public ﬁrm is both eﬃcient as well as SPN equilib-
rium. Our stochastic model shows that when the leader must commit to output before the
resolution of uncertainty, multiple SPNE is possible. Whether the equilibrium outcome is
public or private leadership hinges upon the degree of privatization and market volatility.
More importantly, Pareto-ineﬃcient simultaneous production is a likely SPNE. Our results
are driven by the fact that the resolution of uncertainty enhances the proﬁts of the follower
ﬁrm in a manner that is well known in real option theory.
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1 Introduction
In many industries across many countries private and public ﬁrms compete in oligopolistic
markets. This type of market structure is famously known as mixed oligopoly. Industries char-
acterized by mixed oligopoly range from network (transportation, broadcasting, telecommuni-
cation, mail), energy (gas, electricity), to service (insurance, banking, health care, education)
sectors. Privatization and liberalization of markets dominated by state enterprises have made
mixed oligopoly specially signiﬁcant in transitional and developing countries. Research on mixed
oligopolies have burgeoned since the seminal paper by Merrill and Schneider (1966).1 The in-
terest in this area has heightened in recent years in view of the liberalization and privatization
policies in the so-called transitional economies of Eastern Europe.2
In the traditional models of mixed oligopoly, public and private ﬁrms are assumed to set
output either simultaneously or sequentially giving rise to a Cournot or Stackelberg structure.
Crucially, however, whether the public ﬁrm led or followed was determined exogenously. The
order of moves in a mixed oligopoly model was ﬁrst endogenized by Pal (1998). He adopted
the observable delay game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) where ﬁrms in the ﬁrst stage de-
termine whether to lead or follow and then set quantities accordingly in the later stages. The
sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the extended game then determines whether the
basic quantity game is Cournot or Stackelberg. The signiﬁcance of this approach is that since
the order of moves nonmarginally aﬀects the nature of equilibrium in oligopolistic markets, it is
more satisfactory to have the order emerge as an outcome of an optimizing process. Matsumura
(2003a) adopted a similar procedure to determine the endogenous order of moves in a mixed
oligopoly where the private ﬁrm is foreign owned. An interesting outcome of this research is
that unlike pure oligopolies where the SPNE of the observable delay game results in a Cournot
structure, in a mixed oligopoly SPNE generally only admits a Stackelberg model. Thus, Pal
(1998) showed that when marginal costs are constant and the public ﬁrm is less eﬃcient, equi-
libria with the public ﬁrm as the leader and the follower are both SPNE although social welfare
is higher when the public ﬁrm follows. By contrast, Matsumura (2003a) demonstrated that
when the public ﬁrm competes with a foreign private ﬁrm, leadership of the public ﬁrm is the
equilibrium as well as the socially eﬃcient outcome.
A limitation of the considerable literature on mixed oligopoly, including the ones cited
above, is that the role of uncertainty is generally ignored. In recent studies, Hirokawa and
1See De Fraja and Delbono (1990), Bo¨s (1991), and Nett (1993) for surveys on mixed oligopoly models.
2See Megginson and Netter (2001) and the reference therein for recent privatization trend around the world.
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Sasaki (2001) and Brown and Chiang (2003) introduced demand uncertainty in the standard,
quantity-setting, observable delay game of pure oligopoly. An assumption underlying their
model is that uncertainty is resolved with time so that waiting carries positive option value in a
manner well known in the ﬁnance and investment literature (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). This
implies, therefore, that when quantity commitment is irreversible leadership involves a trade-oﬀ.
The usual advantage of leadership and preemption is now potentially compromised by the lost
option value of waiting or following. A Cournot structure is thus no longer guaranteed as the
SPNE of the extended game.
In the present paper, we introduce demand uncertainty in a mixed oligopoly model. In
particular, we revisit the nature of equilibria in the observable delay games analyzed by Pal
(1998) and Matsumura (2003a).3 ,4 We follow the uncertainty regime in Brown and Chiang
(2003) and assume a linear market demand that is subject to an additive disturbance. The
market is served by a public ﬁrm maximizing a weighted sum of social surplus (the sum of
consumer and producer surpluses and its own proﬁt) and a private proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm
(which could be foreign owned) sharing common technology embodied by quadratic total cost
functions. We assume that uncertainty is resolved after the leader’s commitment to output but
before the follower ﬁrm must make its output decision. Leadership, thus, involves a sacriﬁce of
option value.
In a non-stochastic model, it is well known that the leader has no incentive to deviate from
the committed output since follower’s reaction is incorporated in setting that output. In the
stochastic model, however, leader’s output may well be sub-optimal, ex-post, after the resolution
of uncertainty. Since our interest is to highlight the role of option value in determining the
order of moves, we must, therefore, rule out ex-post deviation from the committed output by
the leader. This scenario is relevant speciﬁcally for industries where technology makes quantity
adjustment very costly. As pointed out in Hirokawa and Sasaki (2001), quantity stickiness may
3Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) suggest two ways of endogenizing the order of moves in duopoly: action com-
mitment and observable delay games. In both timing games the ﬁrms have to move in exactly one of two periods.
Brieﬂy, in the observable delay game ﬁrms announce the period in which they will move before choosing an action.
After the announcements, ﬁrms then select their actions knowing when the other ﬁrm will make its choice. The
game admits a unique equilibrium outcome.
4Besides the observable delay game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), Bagwell (1995) shows that commitment
is completely ineﬀective if ﬁrm’s observations of commitments in early stages of the game are subject to an
arbitrary small noise. van Damme and Hurkens (1997) criticize Bagwell and argue that, under certain regularity
conditions, some mixed strategy equilibria preserves the value of commitment, and hence the Stackelberg game
is a feasible outcome. Adolph (1996) also shows that commitment retains its value if the communication error
is small relative to trembles. Amir and Grilo (1999) ignore communication error in commitments and consider
general demand and cost functions. They ﬁnd that while the Cournot duopoly is a predominant outcome, the
sequential Stackelberg game remains a possibility under the restrictive assumptions that the demand function be
suﬃciently concave. These studies assume that ﬁrms are privately owned.
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also result from market institution. Thus, many commodities are sold through retail outlets
and producing ﬁrms may have a contract with retailers to supply a ﬁxed quantity. “Buying
shelves” is an example of such quantity commitment. Our stochastic mixed oligopoly model
yields results that are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the corresponding deterministic models. Thus,
we demonstrate the existence of multiple SPNE, the nature of which depends on the level of
uncertainty and public ownership. Crucially, we show that unlike in Pal (1998) and Matsumura
(2003a), Cournot outcome is a part of the SPNE set. Since output and social welfare are usually
lower in a Cournot equilibrium than in the Stackelberg leadership case, our result has signiﬁcant
implications for public policy in the context of mixed oligopoly.5
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model in which timing and
output games are played between a public ﬁrm and a domestic private ﬁrm in a stochastic
environment. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium outcomes for a simultaneous-move lead-
ership game. Section 4 takes into account several extensions. Speciﬁcally, we consider (i) the
competition between a public ﬁrm and a foreign private ﬁrm; (ii) the sequential-move leadership
game with the public ﬁrm being the ﬁrst mover; (iii) a general setting where the public ﬁrm is
partially nationalized. Finally, the paper ends with concluding remarks.
2 The Basic Model
Consider a two-stage duopoly game in which players choose to make their output decisions
either in stage 1 or stage 2. Firm 1 is a pure public ﬁrm with a single objective of maximizing
social welfare, while ﬁrm 2 is a proﬁt maximizing private ﬁrm. Firm’s demand function arises
from utility maximization of a representative consumer with quasi-linear utility function. Thus,
the inverse demand function is given by
p = α− (q1 + q2) + θ,
where qi is ﬁrm’s i’s (i = 1, 2) output; α is a demand (scale) parameter large enough for the
equilibrium quantities to be always positive (i.e., α > q1+q2−θ); and θ is a random disturbance
5Our work relates to a number of recent studies that deal with endogenous timing in mixed oligopoly. Recently,
Lu and Poddar (2006) analyze a capacity choice game in mixed duopoly under demand uncertainty. They
developed a two-stage framework in which a public ﬁrm and a domestic private ﬁrm simultaneously choose
capacity in stage 1 before uncertainty becomes known. In stage 2, after the resolution of uncertainty both ﬁrms
simultaneously choose how much output to produce. They obtain clear-cut results including two symmetric and
one asymmetric equilibria. In the symmetric case, when the realized demand is high, ﬁrms’ quantities exceed
their capacity, whereas if the realized demand is low, both ﬁrms carry idle capacity. By contrast, under mild
realized demand, public (private) ﬁrm chooses under (excess) capacity. Lu (2006) extends Pal’s (1998) model by
introducing foreign ﬁrms. He ﬁnds that in equilibrium public ﬁrm always chooses to be the Stackelberg follower.
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term distributed according to the density function f(θ). Note that θ is an idiosyncratic shock,
with zero mean and constant variance, i.e., E(θ) = 0 and V ar(θ) = σ2 > 0. The value of θ is
unknown to all players in stage 1, but it becomes known at the beginning of stage 2.
We assume that ﬁrms are risk-neutral, information is perfect, and ﬁrms play a pure strategy
game. We further assume that before the output game begins, the ﬁrm determines simultane-
ously whether to move early (E) and produce in stage 1 or to follow late (L) and produce output
in stage 2. Given that the random variable will not be revealed until the end of the ﬁrst stage,
the early mover would have to make the output decision before the random variable θ becomes
known. The late mover, however, makes his output decision after the complete resolution of
uncertainty. Given the timing of their moves, there are four possible combination: (i) Both
ﬁrms choose to move late, denoted by (L,L); (ii) Both ﬁrms move early, denoted by (E,E); (iii)
Firm 1 moves early and ﬁrm 2 moves late, denoted by (E,L); and (iv) Firm 1 moves late and
ﬁrm 2 moves early, denoted by (L,E). When ﬁrm’s actions are the same, the Cournot outcome
results (i.e., Cases (i) and (ii)). Games with diﬀerent actions (i.e., Cases (iii) and (iv)) yield
the Stackelberg outcome.
All ﬁrms have identical technologies, represented by the cost function, Ci(qi) = 12q
2
i , i =
1, 2.6 The proﬁt function of ﬁrm i can therefore be written as
Πi(q1, q2) = (α− q1 − q2 + θ)qi − 12q
2
i . (1)
Firm 1 maximizes social welfare W which is deﬁned as the sum of consumers’ and producers’
surplus7, while ﬁrm 2 simply maximizes proﬁt. Both ﬁrms are based in the domestic market.
Speciﬁcally, the W function can be written as
W (q1, q2; θ) =
∫ Q
0
p(x)dx− pQ + Π1(q1, q2) + Π2(q2, q1)
=
∫ Q
0
p(x)dx− C1(q1)− C2(q2)
=
1
2
Q2 + (α−Q + θ)Q− q21/2− q22/2, (2)
6A similar cost function can also be found in Fershtman (1990), Fjell and Pal (1996), Matsumura (2003a),
Chang (2004), and Matsumura and Kanda (2005). For simplicity, we ignore the ﬁxed cost. But, including it will
not aﬀect our results.
7In a stochastic environment, one natural question is whether the standard consumer surplus (CS) or the
expected consumer surplus (ECS) is a valid measure of welfare. Stennek (1999) shows that when consumers are
risk-neutral and have quasi-linear (zero-income elasticity) preferences, the expected consumer surplus is a good
measure of consumer welfare.
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where Q = q1 + q2. Given θ, the payoﬀ functions for ﬁrms 1 and 2 are given by
U1 = W (q1, q2), (3)
U2 = Π2(q1, q2), (4)
respectively. There are four cases to consider: ﬁrst two cases involve similar actions by both
ﬁrms (resulting in the Cournot-Nash equilibria), while the remaining two cases involve diﬀerent
actions by the two ﬁrms (yielding the Stackelberg equilibria).
2.1 Case 1: (L,L)
Both ﬁrms move late. In this case, ﬁrms decide on output level after θ is revealed to all ﬁrms
at the end of stage 1. Each ﬁrm independently maximizes its objective function Ui (i = 1, 2)
subject to qi ∈ +, given its rival’s output qj, j = 1, 2. The ﬁrst-order conditions associated
with (3) and (4) are
α− 2q1 − q2 + θ = 0,
α− q1 − 3q2 + θ = 0,
yielding the equilibrium outputs
q∗1(θ) =
2(α + θ)
5
,
q∗2(θ) =
(α + θ)
5
.
Upon substitution, the expected payoﬀs are therefore
ALL = E(U1) =
8σ2
25
+
8α2
25
, (5)
BLL = E(U2) =
3σ2
50
+
3α2
50
. (6)
The ﬁrst subscript refers to the action taken by ﬁrm 1, while the second subscript represents the
action chosen by ﬁrm 2. Notice that the second term of ALL or BLL is the usual payoﬀs under
certainty. In the presence of uncertainty, taking the output decision after the resolution of the
random variable enhances ﬁrms’ payoﬀs since ﬁrms are now able to make a more well-informed
decisions. The beneﬁt of making a well-informed decision is captured by the ﬁrst term in (5)
and (6). We call this the option value eﬀect. Its magnitude increases with the degree of
uncertainty, σ2. Clearly, the option value eﬀect ceases to prevail under certainty. In this case,
waiting does not carry any information value. One can easily verify this by setting σ2 = 0.
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2.2 Case 2: (E,E)
Both ﬁrms move early. In this case, ﬁrms decide on output level before θ becomes known. Firm
i chooses qi to maximize its expected payoﬀs, E(Ui). This yields
q∗1 =
2α
5
,
q∗2 =
α
5
.
The expected payoﬀs when both ﬁrms move early are therefore
AEE = E(U1) =
8α2
25
, (7)
BEE = E(U2) =
3α2
50
. (8)
Note that if σ2 = 0, then AEE = ALL and BEE = BLL. Given that ALL and BLL increase with
σ2, we obtain
Corollary 1. (L,L) i (E,E) for i = 1, 2.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. The gains from waiting for ﬁrms 1 and 2 are ALL−AEE =
8σ2
25 ≥ 0 and BLL −BEE = 3σ
2
50 ≥ 0, respectively. Corollary 1 is thus proven. 
The result is related to the theory of option value in Finance in that information is valuable
and net beneﬁts that result from waiting are enhanced when markets become more volatile. That
is, waiting is welfare improving. Next, we investigate ﬁrms’ payoﬀs when they take diﬀerent
actions.
2.3 Case 3: (E,L)
Firm 1 moves early and ﬁrm 2 moves late. In this case, the public ﬁrm acts as a Stackelberg
leader, while the private ﬁrm is a follower. As usual, we start with follower’s maximization
problem. Given θ and q1, ﬁrm 2 maximizes
Π2(q2, q1) = (α− q1 − q2 + θ)q2 − 12q
2
2,
yielding the ﬁrst order condition, q2(q1, θ) = (α− q1 + θ)/3. Given this, ﬁrm 1 (i.e., the leader)
then chooses q1 to maximize its expected payoﬀ function given by
E[W (q1, q2(q1, θ))].
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The associated ﬁrst-order condition is
∂E(W )/∂q1 − [∂E(W )/∂q2]/3 = 0.
Solving yields
q∗1 =
5α
14
.
By substitution, the follower’s (i.e., ﬁrm 2’s) optimal output is therefore
q∗2 =
3α
14
+
θ
3
.
Given these, it is straightforward to obtain the expected payoﬀs for ﬁrms 1 and 2:
AEL = E(U1) =
2σ2
9
+
9α2
28
, (9)
BEL = E(U2) =
σ2
6
+
27α2
392
. (10)
2.4 Case 4: (L,E)
In this case, ﬁrm 1 acts as a follower and ﬁrm 2 is the Stackelberg leader. By following the
same procedure, one can obtain the expected payoﬀs for ﬁrms 1 and 2 as follows:
ALE = E(U1) =
σ2
4
+
21α2
64
, (11)
BLE = E(U2) =
α2
16
. (12)
3 Equilibria in a Simultaneous-Move Leadership Game
We are now ready to characterize the equilibria for a game with players setting their leadership
strategy simultaneously. Here, we are interested in knowing which combinations of ﬁrm’s strate-
gies will emerge as an equilibrium outcome. To this end, we consider a 2-player pure-strategy
game Γ = 〈S1, S2, U1, U2〉, where Si (i = 1, 2) is player i’s ﬁnite set of pure strategy. Table 1
summarizes the expected payoﬀ functions of ﬁrms associated with each strategy combination.
where Aij and Bij (i, j = E, L) are given in (5)-(12).
The following deﬁnition presents the solution concept used to characterize the equilibria.
Definition 1. A (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium consists of a strategy s∗i ∈ Si for each player
i (i=1,2) such that
Ui(s∗i , s
∗
j ) i Ui(si, s∗j) for all si ∈ Si.
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Table 1: Public vs Domestic Private Firm
Firm 2
Firm 1
Si Early Late
Early (AEE, BEE) (AEL, BEL)
Late (ALE , BLE) (ALL, BLL)
Thus, for s∗i to be a Nash equilibrium it must be that each player’s strategy yields an
outcome that is at least as high a payoﬀ as any other strategy of the player, given that every
other player j chooses his equilibrium strategy s∗j . In other words, no player has an incentive to
deviate, given the actions of the other player. In what follows, we calculate the Nash equilibria
of the game presented in Table 1.
In this game, each player has two strategies available: early (E) and late (L). The payoﬀs
associated with a particular pair of strategies are given in the appropriate cell of the bi-matrix.
By convention, the ﬁrst payoﬀ belongs to the row player (here, ﬁrm 1), followed by the payoﬀ
of the column player (here, ﬁrm 2). Thus, if both ﬁrms 1 and 2 choose E, then ﬁrm 1 receives
AEE and ﬁrm 2 receives BEE. Similarly, if ﬁrm 1 chooses L and ﬁrm 2 chooses E, then ﬁrm 1
receives ALE and ﬁrm 2 receives BLE . When both ﬁrms choose the same action, the Cournot
game results. In the case of diﬀerent actions, the Stackelberg game results.
Whether the equilibrium outcome is Nash or Stackelberg can be shown to depend on the
degree of uncertainty, characterized by σ2. Let ẑ3 (ẑ4) solves AEL−ALL = 0 (BLE −BLL = 0),
where ẑ3 = 9α
2
616 (ẑ4 =
α2
24 ). The following proposition summarizes our main results:
Proposition 1. Consider a mixed duopoly in which the demand is linear and the cost functions
are quadratic; (i) (E,L) is a Nash equilibrium if 0 ≤ σ2 ≤ ẑ3; (ii) (L,E) is a Nash equilibrium
if 0 ≤ σ2 ≤ ẑ4; and (iii) (L,L) is a Nash equilibrium if σ2 ≥ ẑ4.
Proof. We ﬁrst show that (E, E) cannot be an equilibrium. To see this, calculate
	1 = AEE −ALE = −σ24 − 13α
2
1600 < 0 and 	2 = BEE −BEL = −σ
2
6 − 87α
2
9800 < 0. For (E, E) to
be an equilibrium, it requires that 	1 > 0 and 	2 > 0. Clearly, the requirement for (E, E) to
be an equilibrium is violated.
For (E,L) to be a Nash equilibrium, it must be that 	3 = AEL − ALL = −22σ2225 + α
2
700 ≥ 0
and −	2 = BEL −BEE = σ26 + 87α
2
9800 ≥ 0. The former implies that ﬁrm 1 prefers E to L, while
the latter implies that ﬁrm 2 chooses L over E. Note that −	2 > 0. Thus, whether (E,L) is
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as an equilibrium depends on the sign of 	3. Let ẑ3 solves 	3 = 0, where ẑ3 = 9α2616 > 0. Given
that ∂	3/∂σ2 < 0, we have 	3  0 if σ2  ẑ3. It is evident that (E,L) is a Nash equilibrium if
0 ≤ σ2 ≤ ẑ3. Both ﬁrms will have no incentive to deviate from (E,L). This proves Proposition
1 (i).
For (L,E) to emerge as an equilibrium, we need −	1 = ALE − AEE ≥ 0 and 	4 =
BLE − BLL ≥ 0. Firm 1 has no intention to deviate from L if −	1 > 0. Likewise, ﬁrm 2
would prefer to stick to E if 	4 > 0. As shown above, 	1 < 0 or −	1 > 0. Thus, whether
(L,E) is as an equilibrium depends on the sign of 	4. Recall that ẑ4 solves 	4 = 0, where
ẑ4 = α
2
24 > 0. It is easy to verify that BLE is independent of σ
2 and BLL is an increasing
function of σ2; that is, ∂	4/∂σ2 < 0. For σ2  ẑ4, we have 	4  0. Hence, (L, E) is a Nash
equilibrium if 0 ≤ σ2 ≤ ẑ4. This proves Proposition 1 (ii).
Finally, for (L,L) to be an equilibrium outcome, it requires 	4 = BLE − BLL ≤ 0 and
	3 = AEL − ALL ≤ 0. Note that 	4 ≤ 0 and 	3 ≤ 0 when σ2 ≥ ẑ4 and σ2 ≥ ẑ3. It is easily
veriﬁed that
ẑ4 − ẑ3 = 25α
2
924
> 0.
Hence, (L,L) results if σ2 ≥ ẑ4. This proves Proposition 1 (iii). 
Proposition 1 characterizes the Nash equilibria for various degree of uncertainty. The equi-
librium outcomes include (E,L), (L,E), and (L,L). Interestingly, two types of equilibria can
coexist. Speciﬁcally, (E,L) and (L,E) coexist when 0 ≤ σ2 ≤ ẑ3. In mixed oligopoly under
certainty, Pal (1998) demonstrates that simultaneous production by both ﬁrms can never be a
SPNE. He also shows that both Stackelberg outcomes (public leadership and private leader-
ship) are equilibrium outcomes. Under uncertainty, these results are shown to be robust as
long as the degree of uncertainty is moderate (Proposition 1(i)).
As the degree of uncertainty increases, (L,E) becomes a unique equilibrium. It occurs
when ẑ3 < σ2 < ẑ4 (see Proposition 1(i) and 1(ii)).8 Pal (1998) shows that when the number
of private ﬁrm is more than one in oligopoly, the public leadership never appears in equilibrium.
Along the same line, Matsumura (2003b) uses a two-production period model formulated by
Saloner (1987) and shows that only private leadership is robust. Our result is consistent with
these ﬁndings but through a diﬀerent mechanism.
As σ2 increases beyond ẑ4, (L,L) will emerge as the equilibrium outcome (see Proposition
1(iii)). For suﬃciently higher degree of uncertainty, information value is enhanced and conse-
8Note that ẑ4 > ẑ3 > 0.
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quently, the option value eﬀect begins to dominate the early moving advantage. This provides
a temptation for these two ﬁrms to choose L at the same time. Hence, (L,L) (i.e., the Cournot
competition) results.
The intuition underlying our results is the following. It may be recalled that in Pal’s (1998)
model of mixed oligopoly, with 100% government ownership of the public ﬁrm, the unique
equilibrium is Stackelberg where private ﬁrm leads and public ﬁrm follows. The underlying
reason is that by moving ﬁrst, the private ﬁrm is able to expand production and preempt the
market to its advantage. Since higher output raises social welfare it is also a preferred outcome
for the public ﬁrm. Put diﬀerently, the private ﬁrm wants to produce more to preempt, whereas
public ﬁrm wants to produce more to raise social welfare. Thus, if private ﬁrm were to move
in late, it would lower production to raise price and thereby lower welfare. With demand
uncertainty, there is an additional beneﬁt to waiting for uncertainty to be resolved, stemming
from the well-known concept of option value in ﬁnance and investment. Depending on the degree
of uncertainty, therefore, multiple equilibria can emerge. In particular, when uncertainty is high,
option value eﬀect dominates and both ﬁrms prefer to move in late. When uncertainty is absent
Pal’s (1998) result obtains. For moderate levels of uncertainty ﬁrms trade oﬀ beneﬁts of moving
ﬁrst against the option value of waiting.
The following two corollaries are the immediate consequences of Proposition 1.
Corollary 2. In a mixed duopoly model with a pure public ﬁrm competing against a private
domestic ﬁrm, (E,E) ceases to exist.
Proof. Recall from Proposition 1 that 	1 = AEE − ALE = −σ24 − 13α
2
1600 < 0 and 	2 =
BEE −BEL = −σ26 − 87α
2
9800 < 0. This violates the requirements for (E, E) to be an equilibrium,
thus proving Corollary 2. 
Corollary 3. For a given σ2 such that (L,E) and (E,L) coexist, the social welfare is higher
under (L,E) than under (E,L).
Proof. Calculate ALE −AEL = σ236 + 3α
2
448 > 0. Corollary 3 is thus proven. 
In order to get a feel for the quantitative impact on ﬁrms’ payoﬀ, Table 2 presents some
numerical examples to highlight our ﬁndings (assuming α = 10). In the absence of any
uncertainty (i.e., σ2 = 0), both Stackelberg outcomes (private leadership and public leadership)
emerge as the Cournot equilibria (indicated by asterisk ∗). This ﬁnding is consistent with the
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Table 2: Equilibrium Payoﬀs: Public vs. Domestic Private Firm
σ2 (AEE , BEE) (ALL, BLL) (AEL, BEL) (ALE , BLE)
0 (32.00, 6.00) (32.00, 6.00) (32.14∗, 6.88∗) (32.81∗, 6.25∗)
4 (32.00, 6.00) (33.28, 6.24) (33.03, 7.55) (33.81∗, 6.25∗)
6 (32.00, 6.00) (33.92∗, 6.36∗) (33.47, 7.88) (34.31, 6.25)
Notes: * denotes equilibrium outcome. Boldface indicates highest welfare.
results obtained by Pal (1998), Jacques (2004), and Lu (2007). The numerical examples also
indicate that the social welfare is higher (lower) with the public ﬁrm as a Stackelberg follower
(leader), a result that is well-known in the literature (see Corollary 3).
In the presence of uncertainty, the equilibrium pattern begins to change. For a moderate
level of uncertainty (e.g., σ2 = 4), the model predicts a unique Nash equilibrium, (L,E). That
is, the “private leadership” is optimal. This equilibrium outcome is eﬃcient since the social
welfare is maximized.
However, further increase in the degree of uncertainty (e.g., σ2 = 6) leads both ﬁrms to move
late, resulting in a Cournot equilibrium (L, L). This is in contrast to Pal’s (1998) result that
the simultaneous-move outcome does not constitute an equilibrium in mixed duopoly. Table 2
also indicates that the (L,L) equilibrium is associated with a lower social welfare. That is, the
private leadership is more eﬃcient, but it fails to be an equilibrium.
4 Extensions
In this section, three extensions are considered. First, we modify our basic model by allowing
a foreign private ﬁrm to compete against the public ﬁrm. This extension is not trivial since
it produces non-marginal impacts on the equilibrium outcomes. Second, we extend our basic
model to a sequential setting where the public and private ﬁrms are making their choices in
sequence. It turns out that the equilibrium outcome is either (L,E) or (L,L), depending on
the size of uncertainty. Unlike our results in the previous section, the sequential equilibrium
is unique. Finally, we consider a more general setting in which the public ﬁrm is partially
privatized. As shown below, the degree of privatization (g) and market volatility (σ2) jointly
determine the equilibrium outcomes. All four diﬀerent equilibrium outcomes, (E,E), (E,L),
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(L,E), and (L,L) are possible.
4.1 Public Firm vs Foreign Private Firm
In this subsection, we examine the case where the public ﬁrm is competing against a foreign
rival.9 Since foreign ﬁrms proﬁt is excluded from social surplus, the social welfare function can
be rewritten as
W˜ (q1; θ) =
∫ q1
0
p(x)dx− pq1 +Π1(q1, q˜2),
=
∫ q1
0
p(x)dx− C1(q1),
where q˜2 is the output produced by the foreign rival ﬁrm and W˜ is the associated welfare. The
objective functions of the public and foreign ﬁrms are
Uf1 = W˜ (q1, q˜2),
Uf2 = Π2(q1, q˜2),
respectively. The payoﬀ matrix can be obtained by replacing Aij and Bij in Table 1 by A˜ij
and B˜ij (i, j = E,L), where
A˜EE =
19α2
72
, B˜EE =
α2
24
,
A˜EL =
σ2
18
+
9α2
34
, B˜EL =
σ2
6
+
27α2
578
,
A˜LE =
σ2
4
+
19α2
72
, B˜LE =
α2
24
,
A˜LL =
19σ2
72
+
19α2
72
, B˜LL =
σ2
24
+
α2
24
.
As before, the equilibrium outcome of this game depends on the degree of uncertainty, σ2. Let
z˜3 solves 	˜3 = A˜EL − A˜LL = 0, where z˜3 = α2255 > 0. The results are summarized in
Proposition 2. In a simultaneous-move game in which a public firm is competing against a
foreign private firm, the SPNE entails (i) (L,E) if σ2 = 0, (ii) (E,L) if 0 ≤ σ2 ≤ z˜3, and (iii)
(L,L) if σ2 ≥ z˜3.
Proof. First, we show that (E,E) cannot be an equilibrium outcome. To see this, calculate
	˜1 = A˜EE − A˜LE = −σ24 ≤ 0 and 	˜2 = B˜EE − B˜EL = −σ
2
6 − 35α
2
6936 < 0. The conditions for
9For simplicity, we assume that the foreign ﬁrm does not pay tariﬀ so that the entry to the domestic market
is free. The analysis of tariﬀ in the context of mixed oligopoly can be found in Pal and White (1998) and Chang
(2004).
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(E,E) to be an equilibrium outcome, 	˜1 ≥ 0 and 	˜2 ≥ 0, are clearly violated. Thus, (E,E)
is not sustainable.
Next, we show that (L,E) is an equilibrium only when σ2 = 0. To see this, recall that
−	˜1 = A˜LE − A˜EE = σ24 ≥ 0 and calculate 	˜4 = B˜LE − B˜LL = −σ
2
24 ≤ 0. For (L,E) to be an
equilibrium outcome, it requires that −	˜1 ≥ 0 and 	˜4 ≥ 0. Clearly, these two conditions hold
with equality when σ2 = 0. Hence, (L,E) can (weakly) emerge as an equilibrium when σ2 = 0.
This proves Proposition 2 (i).
For (E,L) to be a Nash equilibrium, it must be such that 	˜3 = A˜EL−A˜LL = −5σ224 + α
2
1224 ≥ 0
and −	˜2 = B˜EL − B˜EE = σ26 + 35α
2
6936 ≥ 0 (which holds with inequality). The former implies
that ﬁrm 1 weakly prefers E over L, while the latter says that ﬁrm 2 would choose L over E. A
deviation from (E,L) can only reduce the payoﬀs of the players. Let z˜3 solves 	˜3 = 0, where
z˜3 = α
2
255 > 0. Note that ∂	˜3/∂σ2 = −5/24 < 0. Therefore, 	˜3  0 if σ2  z˜3. Given that
−	˜2 > 0, it is evident that (E,L) is a Nash equilibrium if 0 ≤ σ2 ≤ z˜3. The condition ensures
that both ﬁrms have no incentive to deviate from (E,L), thus proving Proposition 2 (ii).
Finally, for (L,L) to be an equilibrium outcome, it requires 	˜4 = B˜LE − B˜LL = −σ224 ≤ 0
(which always holds) and 	˜3 = A˜EL − A˜LL = −5σ224 + α
2
1224 ≤ 0. Recall that 	˜3 ≤ 0 when
σ2 ≥ z˜3 > 0. Hence, (L,L) results if σ2 ≥ z˜3. This proves Proposition 2 (iii). 
Proposition 2 implies that there are three diﬀerent equilibrium outcomes, (L,E), (E,L) and
(L,L), depending on the degree of uncertainty. Under certainty (i.e., σ2 = 0), both (E,L)
and (L,E) can coexist as the equilibrium outcomes (see Proposition 2(i) and 2(ii)). When
uncertainty is moderate, the public ﬁrm behaves as a Stackelberg leader, while the foreign ﬁrm
acts as a Stackelberg follower (see Proposition 2(ii)). Matsumura (2003a) shows that the public
leadership outcome is optimal. Here, we demonstrate that his result hold even when a mild
demand uncertainty is introduced. Intuitively, allowing the foreign ﬁrm to act as a Stackelberg
leader is equivalent to giving the foreign ﬁrm a right to preempt. Since the proﬁt earned by
the foreign ﬁrm is excluded from the welfare calculation, higher proﬁt of the foreign ﬁrm does
not translate into higher social welfare. The outcome is thus sub-optimal. To prevent this,
the public ﬁrm would prefer to lead so that higher social welfare is guaranteed. The foreign
ﬁrm is willing to settle for the Stackelberg follower because of the gain in option value.
When uncertainty begins to evolve, both ﬁrms end up producing outputs after the resolution
of uncertainty. This is again driven by higher option values, as we explain earlier.
Table 3 presents some numerical examples to highlight our ﬁndings (again, letting α = 10).
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Table 3: Equilibrium Payoﬀs: Public vs. Foreign Private Firm
σ2 (A˜EE , B˜EE) (A˜LL, B˜LL) (A˜EL, B˜EL) (A˜LE , B˜LE)
0 (26.38, 4.16) (26.38, 4.16) (26.47∗, 4.67∗) (26.38∗, 4.16∗)
0.3 (26.38, 4.16) (26.46, 4.17) (26.48∗, 4.72∗) (26.46, 4.16)
2 (26.38, 4.16) (26.91∗, 4.25∗) (26.58, 5.00) (26.88, 4.16)
Notes: * denotes equilibrium outcome. Boldface indicates highest welfare.
In the absence of any uncertainty (i.e., σ2 = 0), the equilibrium outcome can be either (E,L) or
(L,E). As uncertainty beings to increase (i.e., σ2 = 0.3), the public leadership (E,L) becomes
the only equilibrium outcome. This equilibrium is socially eﬃcient. Further increase in σ2
to 2 will lead both ﬁrms to move late, resulting in (L,L). These results are consistent with
Proposition 2.
Remark: Under certainty (i.e., σ2 = 0), L is a weakly dominated strategy for ﬁrm 1,
while E is a weakly dominated strategy for ﬁrm 2. Following Luce and Raiﬀa (1957), one
may legitimately argue that players would never choose the weakly dominated strategy, (L,E).
With this additional argument, (L,E) is ruled out and Proposition 2(i) becomes redundant.
However, Proposition 2(i) is derived by following the deﬁnition of Nash equilibrium given in the
text.
4.2 Equilibrium in a Sequential-Move Leadership Game
The game we consider so far assumes that ﬁrms choose their leadership strategies simultaneously
and this yields multiple equilibria. In this subsection, we consider the sequential-move leadership
game in which the decision to lead or follow is taken sequentially. We consider the game between
the public and the domestic private ﬁrm.10 It turns out that the Nash equilibrium becomes
unique. To highlight our assertion, assume that the public ﬁrm is the ﬁrst mover who chooses
between E and L. Firm 2 (private ﬁrm) observes the strategy taken by ﬁrm 1 and then responds
to ﬁrm 1’s action accordingly. The game tree is given in Figure 1.
The game is solved, as usual, by backward induction. If ﬁrm 1 chooses E, ﬁrm 2 will respond
by choosing either E or L, which yields (E,E) or (E,L). In this case, ﬁrm 2 would choose E
10A similar exercise can be done with a foreign private ﬁrm competing against the public ﬁrm. It is omitted
to avoid repetition.
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Figure 1: The sequential game
LE
1
L
(AEL, BEL)
E
(AEE , BEE)
2
L
(ALL, BLL)
E
(ALE , BLE)
2
(L) if 	2 = BEE−BEL > (<) 0. As shown earlier, 	2 < 0, implying that ﬁrm 2 would choose
L in this case. Hence, (E, L) results. Alternatively, if ﬁrm 1 chooses L, two possible outcomes
are (L,E) or (L,L). In this case, ﬁrm 2 will choose E (L) if 	4 = BLE − BLL > (<) 0. Note
that 	4  0 if σ2  ẑ4, where ẑ4 = α2/24 > 0. Evidently, (L, E) ((L, L)) results if σ2 < ẑ4
(σ2 > ẑ4). In short, σ2 in relation to ẑ4 determines ﬁrm 1’s optimal choice.
In anticipation of what ﬁrm 2 may do later in the game, ﬁrm 1 as the ﬁrst mover will
determine its strategy that gives him the highest payoﬀ. Two cases are considered:
Case 1: 0 ≤ σ2 < ẑ4 = α2/24. As discussed above, ﬁrm 2 prefers L to E if ﬁrm 1 chooses E.
Given that 0 ≤ σ2 < ẑ4, ﬁrm 2 prefers E to L if ﬁrm 1 chooses L. Knowing this, ﬁrm 1 would
choose E (L) if AEL−ALE > (<) 0. It is easy to verify that AEL−ALE = −σ2/36−3α2/448 < 0,
suggesting that ﬁrm 1 will unambiguously chooses L over E. This yields (L,E).
Case 2: σ2 > ẑ4 = α2/24. In this case, ﬁrm 2 would choose L over E if ﬁrm 1 choose L.
Given this, ﬁrm 1’s would therefore choose E (L) if AEL−ALL > 0 (AEL−ALL < 0). Note that
AEL − ALL = −22σ2/225 + α2/700  0 if σ2  9α2/616. Given that σ2 > α2/24 > 9α2/616,
we can conclude that AEL −ALL < 0 must hold. Therefore, (L,L) emerges as an equilibrium
outcome.
This can be summarized in11
Proposition 3. For a sequential-move leadership strategy game in which the public firm is
the first mover, the unique equilibrium outcome is (L,E) if 0 ≤ σ2 ≤ α2/24 and (L,L) if
σ2 > α2/24.
Proposition 3 states that when the decision to lead or follow is made sequentially, the public
ﬁrm would choose L and the private ﬁrm would respond by choosing E when σ2 is suﬃciently
low. In this case, the private leadership appears to be equilibrium. This result is robust
11If ﬁrm 2 is the ﬁrst mover, a similar analysis can be conducted.
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whenever σ2 ∈ [0, α2/24]. By moving late, the public ﬁrm can control its output to ensure that
the welfare is maximized. But when the market is suﬃciently volatile such that σ2 > α2/24
holds, strong option values will persuade the private ﬁrm to act as the Stackelberg follower as
well. Hence, (L,L) will eventually emerge as the equilibrium outcome.
4.3 Partially-Privatized Public Firm vs Domestic Private Firm
In this subsection, we consider a game between a partly nationalized ﬁrm and a domestic private
ﬁrm.12 Let ﬁrms 1 and 2 be the partly nationalized ﬁrm and the privately owned domestic ﬁrm,
respectively. Let g be the proportion of government’s control of ﬁrm 1, where g ∈ [0, 1]. Thus,
when g = 0, ﬁrm 1 behaves like a private ﬁrm and its objective is to maximize proﬁts. However,
when g = 1, ﬁrm 1 is fully nationalized and its behavior is therefore dictated by social welfare
maximization as analyzed in the basic model (see Section 3). The payoﬀ functions for ﬁrms 1
and 2, respectively, are given by
U1 = gW + (1− g)Π1(q1, q2),
U2 = Π2(q1, q2),
where Πi (i = 1, 2) and W are given by (1) and (2). That is, ﬁrm 1 maximizes a weighted sum
of social welfare and its own proﬁt, while ﬁrm 2 maximizes its own proﬁt. As before, there are
four cases to consider: (L,L), (E,E), (E,L), and (L,E). A straightforward calculation yields
the following expected payoﬀ functions:13
ALL =
2σ2(g − 3)(g2 − 2g − 1)
(3g − 8)2 +
2α2(g − 3)(g2 − 2g − 1)
(3g − 8)2 ,
BLL =
3σ2(g − 2)2
2(3g − 8)2 +
3α2(g − 2)2
2(3g − 8)2 ,
AEE =
2α2(g − 3)(g2 − 2g − 1)
(3g − 8)2 ,
BEE =
3α2(g − 2)2
2(3g − 8)2 ,
12Again, the game between a rival foreign ﬁrm and the public ﬁrm is omitted to avoid repetition. Recently,
Chao and Yu (2006) analyzed a mixed oligopoly game with one public and one or more foreign ﬁrms. They
obtain that foreign competition lowers the optimal tariﬀ rate while partial privatization raises it. Matsumura
and Kanda (2005) show that privatization of the public ﬁrm is not optimal in a free entry market.
13The derivation of these results can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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AEL =
2gσ2
9
+
α2(3g2 − 8g − 4)
14(g − 3) ,
BEL =
σ2
6
+
3α2(2g − 5)2
98(g − 3)2 ,
ALE = − σ
2
2(g − 3) +
(2g − 5)α2(2g3 − 10g2 + 10g + 5)
2(3g − 7)2(g − 3) ,
BLE =
α2(g − 2)2
2(3g − 7)(g − 3) ,
where Aij and Bij denote the expected payoﬀs for ﬁrm 1 and 2, respectively. Whether the equi-
librium outcome is Cournot or Stackelberg can be shown to depend on the government’s share
of the public ﬁrm, characterized by g ∈ (0, 1) and the degree of uncertainty, characterized by σ2.
Let z1 (z3) solves AEE−ALE = 0 (AEL−ALL = 0), where z1 = −α
2(g−2)(6g4−54g3+172g2−219g+82)
(3g−8)2(3g−7)2
(z3 = − 9α
2(g2−4g+2)2
28(3g2−19g+27)(g−3) ). Likewise, let z2 (z4) solves BEE − BEL = 0 (BLE − BLL = 0) ,
where z2 =
9α2(13g2−66g+82)(g2−4g+2)
49(3g−8)2(g−3)2 (z4 =
α2
3(g−3)(3g−7) ). The following proposition summarizes
the Nash equilibria:
Proposition 4. Consider a mixed duopoly with a partially privatized public firm and a domestic
private firm facing linear demand and quadratic cost functions. The Nash equilibrium is (i) (E,
E) if σ2 ≤ min[z1, z2];14 (ii) (E,L) if z2 ≤ σ2 ≤ z3; (iii) (L,E) if z1 ≤ σ ≤ z4; and (iv) (L,L)
if σ2 ≥ z4.
Proof. Let 	1 = AEE −ALE and 	2 = BEE −BEL. By deﬁnition, (E,E) results if 	1 ≥ 0
and 	2 ≥ 0. Let z1 (z2) solves 	1 = 0 (	2 = 0), where
z1 = −α
2(g − 2)(6g4 − 54g3 + 172g2 − 219g + 82)
(3g − 8)2(3g − 7)2  0 if g  0.6257; (13)
z2 =
9α2(13g2 − 66g + 82)(g2 − 4g + 2)
49(3g − 8)2(g − 3)2  0 if g  2−
√
2. (14)
Since ∂AEE/∂σ2 = 0 and ∂ALE/∂σ2 > 0, we have ∂	1/∂σ2 < 0. Thus, if σ2  z1, 	1  0.
Similarly, ∂BEE/∂σ2 = 0 and ∂BEL/∂σ2 > 0, we have ∂	2/∂σ2 < 0. Thus, if σ2  z2,	2  0.
We can therefore conclude that (E,E) results if σ2 ≤ min[z1, z2].15 This proves Proposition 4
(i).
14The relative value between z1 and z2 depends on g. Both functions are decreasing in g ∈ [0, 1]. Note that
z1 = z2 when g = 0 and g ∼= 0.38433. Further note that z1 > (<) z2 if g > (<) 0.38433. Thus, min[z1, z2] = z2
if g > 0.38433 and min[z1, z2] = z1 if 0 < g < 0.38433.
15Note that z1 and z2 can be of either sign. The condition for (E,E) to be an equilibrium may not hold for
all g ∈ [0, 1]. For example, when g = 1, we have z1 < 0 and z2 < 0. We cannot ﬁnd any σ2 ≥ 0 such that
σ2 ≤ min[z1, z2] holds. In this case, Proposition 4(i) becomes redundent and (E,E) can never appear as an
equilibrium. Conversely, when g = 0, then z1 > 0 and z2 > 0. In this case, (E,E) can be an equilibium since
there exists a σ2 ≥ 0 such that σ2 ≤ min[z1, z2] holds. It is clear from (13) and (14) that for σ2 ≤ min[z1, z2]
to hold, g < min[0.6257, 2−√2] = 2−√2.
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For (E,L) to be a Nash equilibrium, it must be that 	3 = AEL − ALL ≥ 0 and −	2 =
BEL −BEE ≥ 0. The former implies that ﬁrm 1 prefers E over L, while the latter implies that
ﬁrm 2 chooses L over E. That is, any deviation from (E,L) will make the players worse oﬀ
(or at least no better oﬀ). Substituting Aij and Bij given in the text, we obtain
	3 = −
2σ2(3g2 − 19g + 27)
9(3g − 8)2 −
α2(g2 − 4g + 2)2
14(g − 3)(3g − 8)2 ,
−	2 =
σ2
6
+
3α2(13g2 − 66g + 82)(g2 − 4g + 2)
98(g − 3)2(3g − 8)2 .
Recall that z2 (given above) solves 	2 = 0. Let z3 solves 	3 = 0, where
z3 = − 9α
2(g2 − 4g + 2)2
28(3g2 − 19g + 27)(3 − g) > 0.
Note that ∂	3/∂σ2 < 0 and ∂(−	2)/∂σ2 > 0. Therefore, for σ2  z3, 	3  0; for σ2  z2,
−	2  0. It is evident that (E,L) is a Nash equilibrium if max(z2, 0) ≤ σ2 ≤ z3; that is, when
this condition holds, both ﬁrms will have no incentive to deviate from (E,L). This proves
Proposition 4 (ii).
To obtain the conditions under which (L,E) results, recall −	1 = ALE − AEE and deﬁne
	4 = BLE − BLL. Firm 1 has no intention to deviate from L if −	1 ≥ 0. Likewise, ﬁrm 2
would prefer to stick to E if 	4 ≥ 0. As shown above, z1 solves 	1 = 0. The cutoﬀ value of
variance for ﬁrm 2 to act as a leader can be obtained by solving 	4 = 0 for σ2, which yields
z4 =
α2
3(g − 3)(3g − 7) > 0.
Note that AEE is independent of σ2, while ALE is an increasing function of σ2. Hence,
∂(−	1)/∂σ2 > 0. For σ2 ≥ z1, we have −	1 ≥ 0, meaning that ﬁrm 1 will continue to
choose L. Moreover, BLE is independent of σ2 and BLL is an increasing function of σ2. Thus,
∂	4/∂σ2 < 0. For σ2 ≤ z4, we have 	4 ≥ 0, implying that ﬁrm 2 will stick with E. In sum,
(L, E) is a Nash equilibrium if max(z1, 0) ≤ σ2 ≤ z4. This proves Proposition 4 (iii).
Finally, for (L,L) to be an equilibrium outcome, it requires 	4 = BLE − BLL ≤ 0 and
	3 = AEL − ALL ≤ 0. Note that 	4 ≤ 0 and 	3 ≤ 0 when σ2 ≥ z4 and σ2 ≥ z3. It is easily
veriﬁed that
z4 − z3 = α
2g(3g − 4)(3g − 11)(3g − 8)2
84(3g − 7)(g − 3)(3g2 − 19g + 27) ≥ 0. (15)
Hence, (L,L) results if σ2 ≥ max(z3, z4) = z4. This proves Proposition 4 (iv). 
Proposition 4 shows that the equilibrium pattern varies with σ2 and g. In a standard
duopoly game with private ﬁrms facing no uncertainty (i.e., g = 0 and σ2 = 0), it is known
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that the early mover (or the leader) has an advantage over the late mover (or the follower).
Therefore, every ﬁrm would want to be a leader, hoping that the rival ﬁrm becomes a follower.
Therefore, it is inevitable that both are caught by a prison’s dilemma, meaning that ﬁrms are
engaged in a “Stackelberg warfare,” each trying not to become a Stackelberg follower. This
yields (E,E). In our mixed duopoly model under uncertainty, we show that apart from (E,E),
the Stackelberg leadership and the Cournot competition can also emerge as the equilibrium
outcomes. Intuitively, while the advantage of being a early mover remains in eﬀect, there are
beneﬁts to the late mover as well. We call this the option value eﬀect, which increases with the
degree of uncertainty and runs counter to the usual ﬁrst mover advantage. The increased option
value eﬀect may reach a point such that one of the two ﬁrms may prefer L to E. This results
in either (E,L) or (L,E).16 As the degree of uncertainty continues to increase, information
value is enhanced and consequently, the option value eﬀect begins to dominate the early mover
advantage. This can lead both ﬁrms to choose L, resulting in (L,L). In short, the equilibrium
outcomes range from the Cournot equilibrium ((E,E) or (L,L)) to the Stackelberg leadership
equilibrium ((E,L) or (L,E)). It is worth noting that for all four these equilibrium patterns
to emerge, it requires that g < min[0.6257, 2−√2] = 2−√2. But if g > 2−√2, (E,E) will
never emerge as an equilibrium outcome since σ2 ≤ min[z1, z2] does not hold for σ2 ≥ 0 (see
Proposition 1(i)). In this case, the equilibrium patterns outlined in Propositions 1 and 4 are
therefore identical. However, Proposition 4 is more general than Proposition 1 (the basic case
with g = 1) since the results hold for 1 ≥ g > 2−√2.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have introduced demand uncertainty in a mixed oligopoly model and revisited
the nature of endogenous equilibria in such a model. In the context of an observable delay
game framework, the standard non-stochastic models generally suggest that the SPNE has a
Stackelberg structure. In particular, Pal (1998) and Matsumura (2003a) demonstrated respec-
tively that a pure public ﬁrm would follow and lead when in competition with a domestic and
a foreign private ﬁrm, respectively. These outcomes are also the socially eﬃcient ones. By
contrast, we show that with demand uncertainty, equilibrium mixed oligopoly structure is not
unique and includes simultaneous production or Cournot structure which is not socially eﬃcient.
16Note that, (E,L) and (L,E) coexist if max[z1, z2] < σ
2 < min[z3, z4] = z3. However, (L,E) becomes the
only equilibrium outcome if z3 < σ
2 < z4.
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The assumption that drives this result is that the leader must irreversibly commit to output
before the resolution of uncertainty. This implies, therefore, that moving late carries positive
option value. When uncertainty is high, option value eﬀect can induce ﬁrms to wait for the
uncertainty to be revealed and move in late. We also examine the sensitivity of the equilibrium
mixed oligopoly structure to levels of uncertainty and state ownership of the public ﬁrm. The
standard non-stochastic results are then shown to be special cases of our general model where
uncertainty parameter is zero and the public ﬁrm is fully nationalized.
This analysis can be extended in many important ways. In this paper, for tractability we
conﬁne our analysis to linear demand and quadratic demand functions. It would be interesting to
check the robustness of our model under more general demand and cost condition. Furthermore,
under uncertainty, one might assume that private ﬁrms are risk-averse, such risk-aversion can
play crucial role when market demand is uncertain. Intuitively, the more risk-averse the ﬁrms
are, the less likely it is for the ﬁrms to move early. This interaction between the uncertainty and
risk parameter can generate some new and interesting market structures. Finally, the present
paper considers one production period. Another possible extension could be to introduce two
production periods model (e.g., Saloner (1987)) in the context of mixed oligopoly. Matsumura
(2003b) analyzed a two production periods in mixed duopoly under no uncertainty. He found
many equilibria including the Cournot equilibrium and the Stackelberg equilibrium with the
public ﬁrm acting as the follower. It is worthwhile to check the robustness of his results under
uncertainty. Of course, this implies that we no longer can utilize the observable delay game.
Finally, some comments on the empirical relevance of our model is in order. Clear example of
mixed oligopoly, where equilibrium leadership structure is shaped by the stochastic environment
in which the ﬁrms operate, is diﬃcult to identify. Indeed, the literature on the equilibrium
structure of mixed oligopolies rarely associates particular equilibria with distinct examples.
This is partly due to the fact that while timing of entry is observable, strategic leadership
structure is often not. Firm level survey coupled with equilibrium output and price information
may reveal the underlying pattern of leadership in mixed oligopolies. Empirical literature has
begun to address this issue. The importance of our paper is that if this research reveals an
underlying Cournot pattern in output setting behavior in a mixed oligopoly then, contrary to
the traditional non-stochastic models, this would be consistent in the context of our model if
uncertainty is high. Sectors like transportation and energy, where mixed oligopoly structure is
common, are the potential examples of market with signiﬁcant demand uncertainty.
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